Anatoly Yakovenko, co-founder of Solana, argues that USD-pegged stablecoins should only be frozen upon a U.S. court order, amid growing controversy over the control of issuers like Circle. He voiced this perspective in a response on the X platform on April 13, following the exploit at Drift Protocol, where approximately $285 million was stolen — mostly USDC — and moved across many blockchains over many hours without timely intervention.
Yakovenko Pushes Court-Controlled Stablecoin Model
In a response to a discussion by ZachXBT on X, Yakovenko argued that freezing stablecoins should not be a discretionary decision of the issuer, but must follow a clear legal process.
Don’t we want a base layer stable that only freezes in a court order? Wrap it with your own stable that has freeze and unwrap policies per vault.
Drift.usdc, kamino.usdc etc… and have a security team that is actually responsible with dealing with hacks.
If it can freeze…
— toly 🇺🇸 (@toly) April 13, 2026
He emphasized that if an asset cannot be frozen outside the scope of the judicial system, it is difficult to consider it “real USD” on the blockchain. This view is not only technical but also raises the issue of redefining stablecoins: whether they are digital assets representing USD, or a form of private money controlled by businesses.
Yakovenko simultaneously suggested a layered structure, in which stablecoins at the base layer maintain “legal neutrality,” while protocols above can build additional control mechanisms if needed. This approach aims to separate monetary infrastructure from application layers, reducing dependence on the decision of a single intermediary.
Drift Exploit Raises Questions Over USDC Controls
The debate over the right to freeze stablecoins has intensified since the attack on Drift Protocol in early April. This incident caused about $285 million to be withdrawn from the platform, of which most was USDC.
The stolen funds were transferred by the hacker from Solana to Ethereum through Circle’s cross-chain system over many hours without timely intervention measures.
On Circle’s side, they asserted that they cannot arbitrarily freeze assets without a request from legal authorities. This stance reflects the boundary between technical capability and legal responsibility. However, immediately after, ZachXBT provided evidence pointing out that Circle has many times proactively frozen assets without waiting for a full legal process, raising questions about the consistency in exercising this power.
Update: $230M+ USDC bridged via CCTP from Solana to Ethereum across 100+ txns.
6 hours is how long Circle had to freeze stolen funds from the $280M+ Drift hack.
Circle is a centralized stablecoin issuer headquartered in New York and the attack began around 12 pm ET.
Why does… pic.twitter.com/v9OKxeOJHN
— ZachXBT (@zachxbt) April 2, 2026
Balancing Control and Risk in Stablecoins
Recent events show the trade-off between control and stability in stablecoin design.
Centralized stablecoins such as USDC allow issuers to intervene in money flows, supporting the handling of fraud or hacks. However, this power also raises concerns about discretion and censorship capability. On the other hand, decentralized or algorithmic models like the former TerraUSD show the risk when lacking control mechanisms, most typically the collapse of about $40 billion in market capitalization related to Do Kwon and Terraform Labs.
Yakovenko’s proposal lies between these two extremes. Instead of giving full power to businesses or completely removing control mechanisms, he proposes linking stablecoins with the existing legal system. This approach could help increase legitimacy and trust, especially for traditional financial institutions, but could also prolong response time in emergency situations, such as hacks or exploits.
Debate Over Who Controls Digital Dollars Intensifies
This proposal appears in the context where stablecoin issuers and lawmakers aim to accelerate a clearer legal framework for this sector. Proposals like the CLARITY Act or GENIUS Act are expected to specifically define the powers and responsibilities of relevant parties.
Organizations like the Bank for International Settlements have repeatedly emphasized stablecoins are essentially a form of private money, and the way they are controlled can directly affect capital flows, liquidity, and the stability of the broader financial market.
Conclusion
The incident at Drift Protocol highlights the limitations of current stablecoin models, while the previous collapse of TerraUSD continues to underscore the risks of inadequate control mechanisms.
In that context, the “court-controlled freeze” proposal of Anatoly Yakovenko suggests a different approach, in which intervention in stablecoins is linked to the legal system instead of a decision from the issuer.
As stablecoins increasingly play a central role in the digital financial market, the way their governance can directly affect the legal framework and the way the market operates in the future.
